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Abstract: This paper discusses the measurement of production and employment effects of 
trade policy, and more broadly the effects of economic integration and globalization.  First, it 
provides a broad-brush overview of the ex-post literature linking trade to performance, such 
as measures of worker displacement, adjustment costs, and econometric evidence on trade 
and wages.  It then defines structural impact indexes, illustrating their use with a stylized 
CGE model-based assessment of the impact of EU enlargement on the transition economies.  
Finally, the last section discusses the gap between our ex-post experience with adjustment 
costs, and what ex-ante methods actually tell us.  
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How does trade policy affect patterns of production and employment, and how does this manifest 
itself in terms of adjustment costs?  This paper is concerned with these issues, exploring how we 
approximate the production and employment effects of trade liberalization, and more broadly the 
effects of economic integration.  The issue is clearly important, as there is a public perception that 
“globalization,” however defined, is driving negative labour market trends.  This in turn has coloured 
the willingness of the OECD governments, under pressure from NGOs and their own electorates, to 
push for further liberalization initiatives.    It also colours our sense of developing country gains from 
liberalization. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses econometric 
approaches to measurement of adjustment costs.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
literature on linkages between economic integration, division of labour processes, and labour 
market adjustment.  The next section then defines structural impact indexes for impact 
assessments.  While these indexes can be used for ex-post or ex-ante assessments, their use is 
illustrated in a numeric (CGE-based) example.    The last section concludes.   
 
1.  ADJUSTMENT COST MEASUREMENT 
At its most basic level, the measurement of the effects of trade liberalization on welfare 
generally involves comparison of welfare levels before and after liberalization, and after all 
factors of production have found their new long-run occupations.  However, such calculations 
need to be adjusted for possible losses during the transition to the new long-run situation, in 
particular if this transition takes a long time.  That is, proper welfare calculus needs to allow 
for social adjustment costs.1 
 A standard measurement of social adjustment costs is the value of output that is 
foregone in the transition to new long-run production patterns because of the time taken to 
reallocate factors from their pre- to their post-liberalization occupations.  There are also other 
                                                 
1 A more extensive discussion of adjustment costs is provided by Matusz (1997). 
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costs that are harder to quantify, such as the mental suffering of unemployed workers, which 
normally fall outside the realm of economic analysis.  The magnitude of adjustment costs is a 
direct reflection of the speed at which the economy manages to redirect resources in response 
to liberalization.  For this reason, they depend on a large number of factors. 2  However, the 
flexibility of labour markets and credit markets is especially important.  If firms in sectors 
with potential for expansion do not have strong incentives to hire new employees, for 
instance because of administrative regulations or externally imposed labour market contract 
requirements, the adjustment will be more costly than otherwise.  Likewise, firms will need 
to invest in order to exploit new opportunities, and this requires access to credit.  The 
possibility of smooth adjustment also depends on the functioning of other markets.  For 
example, the possibility for labour to find alternative employment may depend on the housing 
market.  At the same time, there may be a trade-off between displacement and efficiency 
gains. 
 Adjustment costs are also influenced by the degree of ease with which firms in 
contracting sectors are able to release factors.  For instance, if production in these firms is 
maintained through government support, the adjustment process might be prolonged.  This is 
not to say, however, that it would be economically desirable that factors are laid off 
immediately after liberalization.  From a purely economic point of view, minimization of 
adjustment costs requires a careful balance between the speed at which factors are released 
and the speed at which they can be re-employed.  It is sometimes argued that the existence of 
adjustment costs makes it desirable for the trade liberalization process itself to be gradual.  
                                                 
2 The question of the appropriate design of government measures to ease adjustment has been 
the focus of a recent analytical economic literature, see e.g. Journal of International Economics 36, 
1994, which contains several contributions. There is also an empirical literature which considers the 
efficiency of adjustment programmes.  A common finding is that the resources spent on these 
programmes do not reach the intended targets, but are appropriated by others, see eg. Richardson 
(1982). 
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The question of the appropriate speed of trade liberalization is complex, however, and 
typically also involves the question of political credibility.  
 In theory, trade liberalization may entail a net welfare loss if the gains are sufficiently 
small relative to the adjustment costs. However, such adjustment costs would have to be very 
large relative to the standard gains from trade liberalization in order to dominate the latter.  
Adjustment costs are temporary and must be set against an indefinite stream of future higher 
incomes.  It would therefore take very large costs, or a very short-run perspective (i.e. a high 
discount rate) in order for the costs to outweigh the gains.  This is further reinforced by the 
fact that the (static) gains from trade liberalization tend to grow over time as a result of 
general economic growth.    
 In addition to aggregate effects, one can also consider these costs from the point of 
view of individuals (private adjustment costs).  One reason why these may be important is 
that private adjustment costs are typically unevenly distributed, as some factor markets work 
more smoothly than others to redirect resources that are freed up through liberalization.  
There may also be strong regional differences that imply that different factor owners 
experience different adjustment costs.  The distributional consequences of adjustment can 
have two important ramifications.  First, they may generally be perceived of as being 
undesirable, and may thus call for some form of government intervention on equity grounds, 
in contrast to social adjustment costs which might require government measures on efficiency 
grounds.  But, as always, the least-cost way of providing this assistance would very rarely be 
in the form of protection, but more plausibly as retraining, housing, income support, and so 
on.3 
 Another reason why adjustment costs may be important involves political economy.  
Private adjustment costs are significant determinants, together with the long–run effects of 
                                                 
3 The World Bank (1997) discusses policy measures to ease adjustment costs from a 
developing country perspective. 
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trade liberalization, of the identity of winners and losers from trade liberalization. They 
influence the line-up of interests that might oppose trade liberalization, despite any aggregate 
gains it may bring.  There is a fair amount of empirical evidence that trade liberalization may 
entail significant losses for some groups.  For instance, several studies report that replaced 
workers may earn substantially less in their new occupations, even several years after 
replacement. (Jacobson et al (1993a,b) provide examples of the former case for the United 
States, while a more positive picture is painted in Mills' and Sahn's (1995) study of Guinea.) 
Whether this is a temporary phenomenon, and thus an adjustment cost, or a permanent 
phenomenon, is often difficult to determine. 
 The empirical literature on the magnitude of adjustment costs from trade liberalization 
was rather thin until recently.  This is probably a reflection of the perception among 
researchers during the 1960s and 1970s that adjustment costs were typically quite small in 
proportion to the aggregate gross gains, an impression that is supported by the limited 
number of studies that were undertaken. One approach has been to study outlays in Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) schemes in the United States.  According to Richardson 
(1982), total outlays in trade adjustment assistance under the US Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 were approximately US$75 million for the period 1962-75.  The corresponding figure 
for assistance under the US Trade Act of 1974 for the period 1975-79 was approximately 
US$870 million, with a sharp increase in 1980-81 due to the auto-centred recession.   
 Another method which has also been employed in relation to temporary 
unemployment from trade liberalization is to obtain a rough estimate of the temporary 
income loss by multiplying an estimate of the average amount of time workers are 
unemployed with an estimate of their average wage.  This method was employed in a series 
of papers in the mid-1970s.  For instance, Bale (1976) estimated from a sample of workers 
assisted under the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962 that the average income loss was 
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US$3,370 during 1969-70 for a worker who was displaced because of import competition, 
before taking into account such factors as trade adjustment assistance and unemployment 
insurance. 
 A different approach is taken by Takacs and Winters (1991) in their study of the 
likely effects of the removal of quantitative restrictions in the British footwear industry.  A 
starting point of their analysis is the observation that there is a fairly high natural rate of 
turnover in the industry, even absent trade liberalization (almost 17 percent per year).  Takacs 
and Winters estimate the adjustment costs and the long-run benefits from removal of these 
quantitative barriers, taking into account this turnover.  The magnitude of these estimates 
varies according to the underlying assumptions that are used.  However, the authors report 
that even under their most pessimistic scenario, the adjustment costs are almost negligible in 
comparison to the potential gains from trade liberalization – that is, slightly less than £10 
million in losses compared to £570 million in gains. 
 A more indirect way of assessing the magnitude of adjustment costs has been to 
estimate the share of the restructuring of trade that takes place within industries.4  The basic 
idea is that it is easier for factors of production to move from one occupation to another in the 
same industry, rather than to switch industries.  From this point of view one should expect 
increased import competition between developed countries to be associated with smaller 
adjustment costs per lost job than when the loss stems from expansion of trade associated 
with increased exploitation of comparative advantage. 
 There are also other methods of assessing the magnitudes of adjustment costs.5  It 
should be noted, however, that regardless of the method employed, these calculations should 
be viewed with caution.  For instance, since the costs and benefits of liberalization are 
                                                 
4 See, for example Greenaway et al. (1999). 
5 Examples of other empirical studies, employing a variety of methods, are Baldwin, Mutti and 
Richardson (1980), de Melo and Roland-Holst (1994), Magee (1972), de Melo and Tarr (1990), and 
Mutti (1978). 
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typically distributed unevenly through time, they are sensitive to the assumed rate of 
discounting of future gains and losses - an assumption which by its very nature must be quite 
arbitrary.  However, despite differences in methodological approach and in underlying 
assumptions, ex-post empirical studies typically convey the message that social adjustment 
costs are small, in aggregate, in comparison to the standard gains from trade liberalization.  
At the same time, they can be very significant for the individuals affected.  
 
2.  WAGES 
While trade liberalization may enlarge the economic pie, its allocation can be affected by 
trade liberalization even as it is enlarged.  Understandably, this is a highly sensitive issue.  
For this reason, though technology appears to emerge from the data as the current driving 
force behind recent labour market changes, the linkage between trade liberalization and 
labour market conditions will continue to be an important issue.  Additionally, while the 
Heckscher-Ohlin argument for trade-wage linkages does not loom large in the evidence, more 
recent work on alternative frameworks does point to potentially strong linkages through 
alternative channels.  (See Francois and Nelson 2004, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003.) 
 For the great majority of the research on the link between trade and wages, the logic 
of the argument is straightforwardly represented by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and the 
source of the problem is seen, more-or-less explicitly, to be trade with developing countries. 
(The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is derived from the same theoretical explanations of 
comparative advantage discussed earlier with respect to the allocation gains from trade.  It 
points to an immediate link between trade prices and relative labour income.)  Despite the 
beauty of the theory, a compelling argument against the plausibility of Stolper-Samuelson-
based arguments is that trade with developing countries constitutes too small a share of 
OECD economic activity to generate effects of the magnitude observed in the 1980s.  
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Another weakness in the story is evidence that the earnings/employment gap has opened in 
the same direction across developing countries as well (see Wood 1997), suggesting that it 
may be technology rather than trade that is driving events. 
 Given the ease with which the HOS model yields an estimating framework, it is not 
surprising that the empirical literature on trade and wages has derived primarily from 
competitive models of the HOS family.  By contrast, imperfectly competitive models come in 
a variety of forms, most of which do not yield as readily to econometric representation as do 
the competitive models.  For this reason, work in imperfectly competitive frameworks has 
been largely CGE-based.  Even so, we do have some econometric evidence of economic 
geography mechanisms, and related effects, outside the HOS framework.  Building on the 
fundamental work of Ethier (1982) and Markusen (1990), Markusen and Venables (1997, 
1999) develop a two-sector, two-factor model characterized by one conventional (i.e. 
constant returns to scale) sector and one sector characterized by monopolistic competition 
and division of labour induced external scale economies.   Markusen and Venables are 
interested in North-South issues, so their two-country model involves endowment differences 
as well as the division of labour structure.  Within this framework, the authors show that 
effects of a reduction in barriers to multinationalization have ambiguous effects on the wage 
premium.  Using a similar production structure, Lovely and Nelson (2000) examine trade 
between similar countries and wages,  Francois and Nelson (2001, 2004) analyze both trade 
and foreign direct investment between similar countries, and its effect on the wage premium. 
The recent book by Dluhosch (2000) and the paper by Burda and Dluhosch (2001) emphasize 
outsourcing and relative wages.    
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3.  STRUCTURAL IMPACT INDEXES 
The basic approach to ex-ante assessment (in a developed or developing country context) 
involves the application of a partial or general equilibrium simulation model.  (See Francois 
and Reinert 1997).  The next section provides an example, where we employ a number of 
indexes for tracking the structural impact of policy changes on economy-wide employment 
and output patterns.  For the example, these are defined with respect to the n sectors in an 
applied general equilibrium model, though they could also be defined with respect to the 
population of firms within a sector (if we had the data and estimates of within-sector 
production and output variation).  The first index is simple, representing percent changes in 
output at the sector level: 
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measurement of output changes.  These are basically variance-based indexes of our sector 
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As noted above, n  is our index defined over sectors. We then follow with a measure of the 
change in economy-wide employment earnings I4. 
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Next, we work in the example with a set of measures of the change in employment across 
sectors and across the economy.  These are built on the change in employment at the sector 
level I5. 
 
(5) 
100,5 ×=
j
j
j L
dL
I  
sector employment change index 
 
Based on I5, we also work with two variance-based indexes, an un-weighted index )( 5Is  and 
a weighted index )(~ 5Is .  (Wage bills are used as weights, as this information is usually 
available.  Of course, other weights, such as full-time equivalent jobs, could also be used). 
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Finally, we also focus (where appropriate given model assumptions) on the change in total 
employment, as indexed by I8. 
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Collectively, the indexes in equations (1) to (8) provide some indication of changes in the 
pattern of production and employment across sectors.  No one of them really provides an 
adequate picture (as will be seen in the numeric example), though together they do provide 
some sense of the direction and desirability of relative changes induced by policy.  This will 
be illustrated in the next section. 
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4.  AN EXAMPLE 
We now turn to a computational example to highlight the use and interpretation of the 
structural impact indexes defined above.  This involves a large multi-region CGE model.  The 
model includes monopolistic competition in industrial and service sectors as developed 
above.  It also includes sluggish mobility of labour, as described in the annex.  The 
experiment involves the pending enlargement of the EU, and its impact on the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  However, the reader should not take the results 
too seriously, but should instead focus on the pattern of variation in results and the apparent 
information content of various measures.   
 
4.1 THE MODEL 
The model is a multi-sector general equilibrium model, characterized by intermediate 
linkages and monopolistic competition.  It is a version of the GTAP model (Hertel 1996), 
modified to include imperfect competition exactly as developed in the annex.  (See Francois 
1998).  This means that Armington trade in industrial and service sectors, a feature of the 
standard GTAP model, is replaced with monopolistic competition.  The Hertel and Francois 
papers provide full documentation on the theory and implementation of the model.6   
Like most CGE models, this one is characterized by an input-output structure that 
explicitly links industries in a value added chain from primary goods, over continuously 
higher stages of intermediate processing, to the final assembling of goods and services for 
consumption.  Inter-sectoral linkages are direct, like the input of steel in the production of 
transport equipment, and indirect, via intermediate use in other sectors.  CGE models capture 
                                                 
6 Note that there is a long history of including monopolistic competition in CGE models.  Hence, 
under a different name, some CGE modellers have been working with "new geography" models since 
the early 1980s.  See Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) on this point. 
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these linkages by modelling firms' use of factors and intermediate inputs.  The most 
important aspects of the model used here are the following:  (i) it covers all world trade and 
production; and (ii) it allows for scale economies and imperfect competition. Consumer 
demand is generated from a representative regional household with Cobb-Douglas 
preferences over sectoral composites. This is a departure from the standard GTAP 
specification of demand. 
The multi-region model used here divides the world into sixteen regions: Germany 
(DEU), France (FRA) , the Netherlands (NED), the rest of the EU (REU15), the recently 
confirmed candidate countries (CEECs), the Mediterranean economies (MED),  North 
America (NAM), South America (SAM), China (CHINA), India (INDIA), high income Asia-
Pacific economies (HINCPAS), other Asia-Pacific (OASPAC), Australia and New Zealand 
(AUSNZ), South Africa (SAF), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and the rest of the world (ROW).  
Each region is modelled with 17 sectors: cereals (CERE), horticulture (HORT), sugar 
(SUGA), intensive livestock (INTLIV), cattle (CATLE), dairy products (DAIRY), other 
agriculture (OAGR), processed foods (PROCF), textiles and clothing (TEXT), extraction and 
mining (EXTR), chemicals and petrochemicals (CHEM), machinery and electrical machinery 
(MELE), other industry (OIND), trade services (TRAD), transport services (TRAN), business 
services (BSVC), and other services (OSVC). Each sector consists of differentiated products, 
and consumer and firm demand for these are generated by CES preferences.  Government 
services are produced through a Cobb-Douglas technology, which means that government 
expenditure shares over product categories are fixed.  Consumption is defined as a Cobb-
Douglas composite of private and government consumption.   
Scale economies and monopolistic competition are modelled in manufacturing and 
services, exactly as developed in the annex. In particular, based on evidence of scale 
economies (Martins et al 1996), we model sectors as being characterized by Chamberlinian 
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large-group monopolistic competition for traded intermediate and final goods.   Other sectors 
(primary products and agriculture) are characterized by constant returns and perfect 
competition, with output differentiated by regions (the Armington assumption).  Formally, 
factors are combined according to a CES function, while intermediates are used in fixed 
proportions.  Both approaches (Armington and monopolistic competition) have two 
significant ramifications: (i) intermediate input prices enters firms' cost functions, so price-
raising trade barriers directly affect firms' costs, and (ii) firms' demands for each variety of 
intermediates, whether differentiated by region (Armington assumption) or firm 
(monopolistic competition) follows standard CES derived demand functions.  With product 
differentiation in all sectors, the model supports two-way trade in all traded sectors.  Trade 
and scale elasticities are reported in Table A1. 
The cost of trade is modelled explicitly as consisting of a combination of trade and 
transport services.  Revenue from non-frictional trade barriers are returned to the 
representative consumer in each region.  This includes quota rents, which are generally 
modelled as accruing to exporters.   Regional labour and capital supplies are assumed to be 
fixed.  (Capital is held fixed so that we can focus on resource shifts, without the additional 
complication of resource accumulation.)  
With the exception of substitution and scale elasticities, which are drawn from the 
literature, model parameters are calibrated to social accounting data from the 2002 revision of 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 5.2 data base.  The GTAP dataset includes 
information on national and regional input-output structure, bilateral trade flows, final 
demand patterns, and government intervention, and is benchmarked to 1997.  Bilateral tariff 
data are based on World Bank and WTO data on post-Uruguay Round protection, and reflect 
differential bilateral weighting of detailed trade data within model sectors.  In addition, a 
stylized version of Agenda 2000 is also imposed on the benchmark database. 
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4.2 THE EXPERIMENT 
Our experiment involves (1) a reduction in frictional trading costs between the European 
Union and the CEECS, corresponding to 2 percent of the value of trade; (2) free agricultural 
trade and harmonization of all border measures; (3) extension of the CAP subsidy scheme, 
with subsidies at 25% of EU15 rates.    It does not include capital market effects (see Baldwin 
et al 1996), since at this point in time these are most likely reflected already in expectations, 
and hence in the base data.  Some sensitivity analysis is offered vis-à-vis the mobility of 
labour between sectors.  This is captured by a parameter (technically an elasticity of 
transformation) as discussed in the annex.  
We introduce two labour market closures.  In the first, labour markets are flexible, 
and employment is fixed in aggregate for skilled and unskilled labour.  In the second, wages 
are fixed in Europe (the EU and the CEECs), while employment adjusts.  Taken together, 
these provide some bound on the likely set of wage and employment effects. 
 
4.3 RESULTS (STRUCTURAL IMPACT) 
What are the results of our experiment?  The basic results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 
and Figures 1 and 2. These are based on the index measurements defined in equations (1) to 
(8).  The basic pattern of results is similar with both rigid and flexible labour markets, at least 
on the output side.  However, if one examines the results closely, on the employment side the 
effects are rather different.  First, in Table 1, we have a contraction in the processed foods 
sector, other industry, and agriculture.  The food and agriculture results follow from forcing 
harmonization of external border measures, while allowing subsidies in the EU15 for 
agriculture at a rate 300 percent above the rate in the CEECs. (This reflects the actual 
Enlargement, where the CEECs receive only a fraction of comparable EU15 CAP subsidies, 
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even as external measures are harmonized.)  There is also a dramatic expansion of textile and 
clothing production relative to the benchmark.  We also have a dramatic increase in real 
wages, and a rise in the wages for unskilled workers relative to skilled workers. 
 
Insert Tables 1, 2, Figures 1,2 about here. 
 
What about adjustment costs?  Our best approximation is the measures of deviation in 
output and employment.  Here, Table 1 shows that the un-weighted index  places excess 
weight on small sectors.  When we introduce weighting, the apparent shifting of labour across 
sectors is reduced, with a standard deviation around 7 percent of employment rather than 9 
percent.  This is still a large number.  The actual amount of labour displacement hinges on the 
ease with which workers are moved between sectors.  In the flexible wage scenario, added 
mobility buys more worker movement between sectors, and in turn a greater efficiency gain 
and higher average wages.  This comes at a price, however, as illustrated in Figure 1. Greater 
labour market flexibility, in this sense, buys greater wages at the cost of greater worker 
displacement. 
The same pattern appears to hold in Figure 2, which is based on the rigid wage model 
results reported in Table 2.  Again, we see an apparent trade-off between job creation and the 
general degree of labour flexibility.  However, this is actually misleading.  If we examine the 
raw employment numbers in Table 2, we can see that a good deal of the “churn” in the labour 
market involves new entrants (or re-entrants).  In fact, roughly three-quarters of the volatility 
is associated with simple expansion.  Increased flexibility, in a positive environment, yields 
much more rapid job growth than less flexible markets, with job growth far outpacing 
displacement. 
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The differences in Tables 1 and 2 highlight the importance of viewing indicators of 
this type collectively, rather than individually.  Labour displacement may not be what it first 
appears, just as sector effects, uncontrolled for sector size, may be misleading with respect to 
adjustment pressures.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
This paper is concerned with metrics used for the measurements of the output and 
employment effects of trade and trade policy, and their implications for assessing adjustment 
costs and the sustainability impact of policy.  The paper provides both a broad-brush 
overview of the literature on ex-post assessment, and a discussion of ex-ante measurement.  
Ex-ante measurement is illustrated with a CGE application involving a stylized EU 
enlargement. 
The econometric literature, based on the historic experience of OECD economies, 
stresses a number of issues.  These include the displacement of labour within as well as 
between sectors, transition dynamics, cross-border outsourcing, and natural labour force 
turnover.  These map directly into the determination of the adjustment costs of policy 
changes, though they are likely to miss important issues (like market fragmentation and 
rigidities) especially important in developing countries.  A similar set of issues is highlighted 
in the computational model-based simulation literature.  Unfortunately, the measures 
available from computational exercises don’t actually touch on several of the issues stressed 
in the literature on actual experience.  In simulation models, we do not usually have the data 
or structure needed to model within sector (i.e. sector-specific) labour market churn.  Neither 
do we offer an adequate treatment of outsourcing mechanisms.  “Transition dynamics” is 
synonymous with investment processes rather than labour force movements in the 
computational literature.  And while labour mobility and natural turnover clearly matter, we 
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don’t know enough yet to treat these issues adequately either.  In short, we need more 
research.   
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Annex:  scale economies and labour mobility in the model  
This annex is concerned with critical structural features of the CGE model used in Section 5 
to illustrate the use of structural impact indexes.  This includes representation of scale 
economies, labour mobility, and basic model parameters. 
 
A.1 VARIETY SCALING 
We start with a representation of trade under monopolistic competition that involves "variety-scaled" 
rather than physical output. This approach buys us a great deal of analytical simplicity when we turn 
to stability properties and the scope for inter-sectoral adjustment.  Differentiated goods may be 
differentiated consumer goods, or producer goods that are assembled before the final good is sold 
locally.  In either interpretation, there will be variety-related benefits to location.   These benefits are 
further magnified in the computational section of the paper, where we also add intermediate linkages, 
reinforcing the advantages of location. 
We first assume that individual firms producing variety xj of good X are monopolists working 
under a homothetic cost function defined over an input price vector w and subject to a fixed cost ad 
constant marginal cost.  Free entry forces the standard average cost pricing solution, alongside the 
monopoly mark-up rule.  The elasticity of is derived from standard S-D-S preferences, and hence is a 
constant value s (which also equals the elasticity of substitution.  Formally, in the X sector, we have 
the following cost and price relationships: 
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In equations (A1)-(A3), P denotes price, C(.) denotes total cost for the firm producing x, and f(w) is 
the linear homothetic cost function for a bundle of inputs (designated Z below).  Taken together, 
equations (A2) and (A3) mean that firms are of an identical size (we have a symmetric equilibrium), 
and that change in industry scale will be proportionate to change in the number of varieties in the 
industry.  In particular, we will have: 
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The scale of individual firms will be fixed, while the equilibrium price for each individual variety will 
be a linear function of the cost of input bundle Z.  The demand for individual varieties follows from 
the standard S-D-S aggregation function: 
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In equation (A6), the term g denotes a constant applied to each variety. The elasticity of substitution 
of substitution will be s=1/(1-r), where 0<r<1.  For the moment, assume that we have two sources of 
varieties, designated 1 and 2.  These sets of varieties originate in different countries.  We will 
maintain the large group assumption throughout (i.e. demand elasticities remain unchanged), but now 
we subdivide equation (A6) to reflect the split sourcing of varieties.  Note that, as long as we maintain 
the assumption of symmetry across firms from source 1 and 2, then we will consume identical 
quantities over all source r varieties. 
(A7) [ ] rrr /1222111 xgnxgnq ××+××=  
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In equation (A7), the subscript now designates (identical) varieties from a given national source, and 
nr denotes the number of varieties associated with that source.  Note that we have a CES weight that 
applies identical across varieties from a given source.  We next modify equation (A7) so that it is 
defined over aggregate physical quantities (i.e. X=nx). 
 
(A8) [ ] rrrrr /112212111 1 --- ××+××= XgnXgnq  
 
If we hold variety constant, then equation (A8) is operationally identical to an Armington aggregation 
function.  We will next write equation (A8) purely in terms of variety-scaled quantities V, so that we 
can simplify the demand side of the model by specifying it in terms of variety-scaled output.  This 
involves one last rearrangement of equation (A8). 
 
(A9) [ ] rrr /12211 VgVgq ×+×=  
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On the demand side, we will work directly with equation (A9).  Variety effects are embodied in the 
variety-scaled quantity defined by equation (A10), which we will treat as a supply-side phenomenon.  
Written in this way, variety works like a regional quality or scale effect that is realized at the industry 
level.  
We turn next to the supply side of the model.  We focus on sectoral output to start, but will 
later embed this structure into a multi-sector framework.  On the supply side, assume that in country i 
bundles Zi are available for production of varieties xi of good X.  From equation (4), we then have the 
following: 
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where XiT represents total physical production of X in country i.  Because expansion of the X sector 
involves entry of identically sized firms, both physical output and variety are linear in input of 
bundles Z.  Putting these two terms together with equation (A10), we can derive the implicit sectoral 
production function for variety-scaled output V. 
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or to simplify 
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Taken together, equations (A9) and (A14) let us simplify (in a useful way) the mathematics of 
production and trade with specialization-based returns to scale.  Basically, sectoral demand is CES 
and defined over variety-scaled quantities from all sources, while sectoral supply of variety-scaled 
varieties exhibits a form of external scale economies common in the literature.  Our representation of 
the model works, in reduced form, like a standard Armington model with external scale economies.  
Working with Armington-type quantities helps in isolating the stability properties of this class of 
models, and their sensitivity to factor mobility issues. 
 
A.2 THE SUPPLY SIDE: STABILITY AND THE SCALE OF LOCAL ADJUSTMENT 
We now want to embed the production side of the model into a general equilibrium framework.  This 
will allow us to explore, analytically, the relationship between local agglomeration effects (due to 
variety) and the adjustment of output to price shocks.  To do this, we assume a transformation 
technology between bundles Z and a homogeneous good Y.  Factor markets are assumed competitive, 
so that the price of Z will correspond to the marginal rate of transformation between Z and Y.  
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Furthermore, because we have average cost pricing vis-à-vis equation (A14), we can also map the 
supply-side price of V directly to the price of Z, and hence to the supply response in V and Z as we 
move along the production possibility frontier. 
Our transformation technology, in reduced form, is represented as follows: 
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The price of bundles will be the following: 
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Average cost pricing means that we will also have 
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Making a substitution of (A17) into (A16) and solving for percent changes, we can derive the 
following. 
 
(A18) iiYiVi ZZPP ˆ'
''
'
''ˆˆ ×ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
Q
Q
-×=-
g
g
 
 
Equation (A18) relates changes in equilibrium supply of Z to changes in the relative prices of V and 
Y.  The first term captures the relative curvature of the production possibility frontier (defined over 
bundles and Y), while the second term captures the relative curvature of the Q function, which 
depends on variety effects.  In a constant returns to scale model, the second term vanishes, and we 
simply have a variation of the classic Jones-type equation relating changes in supply to changes in 
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relative prices.  In the present setting, however, the presence of variety-specialization effects 
complicates the analytical mix. 
Consider the case where we have local stability (in the sense that the sign of equation (A18) is 
positive).  For a policy shock ultimately manifested, at least to producers, as a shift in producer prices, 
the corresponding magnitude of the shift in output will depend on how strong the scale effect is, as 
transmitted through the Q function.  The stronger it is, the greater the output response associated with 
a given price change, if equation (A17) is to hold.  In other words, even for local adjustment from one 
stable equilibrium to another, how local such adjustment to a price shock will actually be will depend 
on the magnitude of scale effects.  The larger the scale effects, the greater the corresponding shift in 
resources associated with an observed shift in relative prices.  Of course, if the sign of equation (A18) 
is negative, then the local equilibrium is unstable, with a well-known potential for corner solutions 
(Francois and Nelson 2002). 
 
A.3 FACTOR MOBILITY AND OUTPUT ADJUSTMENT 
We now turn to the issue of local adjustment, and the role of factor mobility.  By factor mobility, we 
are not referring to cross-country movement of factors.  While this is an important theme in the recent 
geography literature and older scale economy literature (Krugman and Venables 1995; Markusen 
1988; Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz 1991), our concern instead is the ability of factors (and in 
particular labour) to move between sectors within a country as employment opportunities shift.  In 
terms of equation (A18), the inter-sectoral mobility of labour can be examined through its impact on 
the curvature of the g function. 
 To develop this issue further, we will impose more structure on the g function.  In particular, 
we follow the older literature on inter-sectoral factor mobility (see for example Casas 1984;  Hertel 
and Tsigas 1996) and assume that a constant elasticity of transformation will characterize our ability 
to shift resources between the Z and Y sector.  In generic terms, this may follow from underlying 
differences in technology across sectors, as well as from factor mobility.  However, for the moment, 
we focus on factor mobility.   
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Formally, the g function that can be derived from a CET is represented as follows: 
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In equation (A19), the term j>1, and we will have an elasticity of substitution along the ZY frontier 
that is concave to the origin, and characterized by a constant elasticity or transformation W=1/(f-1), 
where 1<W£¥.  With an infinite transformation elasticity, the transformation frontier is linear. 
Given equations (A14) and (A19), equation (A18) then can be written as follows: 
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The first term in brackets {} captures the curvature of the CET, through the parameter f and our 
location on the transformation frontier, while the second term captures variety scaling effects.   
Note that in the large group case, with homothetic cost functions, the variety-scaling term is 
actually a constant, so that local stability ends up depending entirely on variations in the curvature of 
the transformation frontier.  This actually characterizes much of the recent literature, which employs 
Ricardian single factor models (i.e. linear transformation surfaces).  In effect, this approach assumes, 
in reduced form, that corner solutions will be highly likely, along the lines of Kemp's (1964) work on 
Ricardian  models with external scale economies. 
In the body of the paper, we employ equation (A19), in a multi-sector general equilibrium 
model including intermediate linkages and monopolistic competition (a.k.a. a computational 
geography model) with a range factor mobility values.    
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A.4 Model Parameters 
 
Model parameters are listed below.  The model is as described in Hertel and Tsigas (1996) and 
Francois (1998).  CDRs are used to calibrate output-scale elasticities for variety-scaled output. 
 
Table A1 
Model Parameters
A B C D = (B-1)/B E = 1/D
trade 
substitution 
elasticities 
(regional 
differentiation)
average markup 
levels
elasticity of 
substitution in 
value added implied CDRs
trade 
substitution 
elasticity (firm 
differentiation)
CERE Cerals 2.200 1.000 0.246 0.000 2.200
HORT Horticulture & other crops 2.200 1.000 0.246 0.000 2.200
SUGA Sugar, plants and processed 2.200 1.000 0.639 0.000 2.200
INTLIV Intensive livestock &products 2.497 1.000 0.545 0.000 2.497
CATLE Cattle & beef products 2.453 1.000 0.571 0.000 2.453
DAIRY Milk & dairy 2.200 1.000 0.645 0.000 2.200
OAGR Other agriculture 2.754 1.000 0.203 0.000 2.754
PROCF Processed food products 2.472 1.125 1.120 0.111 8.983
TEXT Textiles, leather & clothing 3.316 1.126 1.260 0.112 8.909
EXTR Extraction industries 2.800 1.177 0.200 0.151 6.638
CHEM Petro & chemicals 2.050 1.200 1.260 0.167 6.005
MELE Metal and electotechnical ind 3.386 1.212 1.260 0.175 5.720
OIND Other industries 2.299 1.202 1.260 0.168 5.946
TRAD Trade services 1.900 1.273 1.680 0.214 4.670
TRAN Transport services 1.900 1.273 1.680 0.214 4.670
BSVC Business, financial & commun. services 1.900 1.273 1.260 0.214 4.670
OSVC  Other private and public services 1.975 1.273 1.286 0.214 4.670  
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Figure 1 
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   Figure 2 
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Table 1 
 Fixed Employment, Flexible Wages       
       ? -------  low              LABOR MOBILITY              high -------?  
    s =1 s =3 s =5 s =10 s =50 s ˜ inf 
equation   Production Effects             
(1) Percent changes in sector output             
    Cereals -1.99 -2.71 -2.99 -3.27 -3.56 -3.62 
    Horticulture & other crops -3.25 -3.95 -4.20 -4.44 -4.68 -4.72 
    Sugar, plants and processed 4.30 3.54 3.20 2.85 2.48 2.40 
    Intensive livestock &products -0.44 -0.76 -0.88 -1.00 -1.12 -1.14 
    Cattle & beef products 4.44 4.61 4.65 4.67 4.68 4.68 
    Milk & dairy 3.04 3.11 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.11 
    Other agriculture -0.91 -1.28 -1.42 -1.57 -1.71 -1.74 
    Processed food products -8.23 -10.47 -11.36 -12.25 -13.17 -13.35 
    Textiles, leather & clothing 15.06 21.91 24.96 28.23 31.83 32.55 
    Extraction industries -0.41 -0.61 -0.69 -0.77 -0.86 -0.88 
    Petro & chemicals 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.09 
    Metal and electotechnical ind 6.00 6.82 7.03 7.16 7.24 7.24 
    Other industries -3.77 -4.81 -5.25 -5.69 -6.15 -6.25 
    Trade services -0.83 -0.95 -1.01 -1.06 -1.12 -1.14 
    Transport services 2.21 2.02 1.91 1.79 1.64 1.60 
    Business, financial & communications services -2.05 -2.35 -2.47 -2.59 -2.71 -2.73 
    Other private and public services -1.02 -1.23 -1.31 -1.38 -1.45 -1.47 
(2) Un-weighted output deviation index 5.06 6.76 7.51 8.31 9.20 9.38 
(3) weighted output deviation index 4.40 5.68 6.22 6.80 7.43 7.55 
     Employment Effects             
(4) Unskilled wages (average change) 7.83 8.02 8.10 8.18 8.26 8.28 
(4) Skilled wages (average change) 6.37 6.54 6.61 6.67 6.73 6.75 
(6) Unweighted employment deviation index -- unskilled 3.52 5.90 6.93 8.01 9.21 9.45 
(6) Unweighted employment deviation index -- skilled 3.60 6.05 7.11 8.24 9.48 9.73 
(7) Weighted employment deviation index -- unskilled 3.94 6.77 7.97 9.23 10.60 10.88 
(7) Weighted employment deviation index -- skilled 2.14 3.48 4.00 4.53 5.09 5.20 
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Table 2 
 Flexible Employment, Fixed Wages       
       ? -------  low              LABOR MOBILITY              high -------?  
    s =1 s =3 s =5 s =10 s =50 s ˜ inf 
equation   Production Effects             
(1) Percent changes in sector output             
    Cereals 1.95 1.34 1.11 0.89 0.66 0.62 
    Horticulture & other crops 0.57 -0.12 -0.33 -0.54 -0.73 -0.76 
    Sugar, plants and processed 8.53 8.01 7.77 7.50 7.22 7.17 
    Intensive livestock &products 3.37 3.17 3.11 3.06 3.02 3.02 
    Cattle & beef products 8.55 8.96 9.10 9.23 9.36 9.39 
    Milk & dairy 7.08 7.43 7.55 7.68 7.81 7.83 
    Other agriculture 2.45 2.25 2.20 2.14 2.09 2.08 
    Processed food products -3.87 -5.97 -6.83 -7.69 -8.59 -8.77 
    Textiles, leather & clothing 23.34 32.68 36.85 41.32 46.29 47.28 
    Extraction industries 1.86 1.42 1.28 1.16 1.03 1.00 
    Petro & chemicals 5.01 5.44 5.59 5.75 5.91 5.94 
    Metal and electotechnical ind 11.13 12.53 12.92 13.22 13.45 13.48 
    Other industries 0.54 -0.03 -0.30 -0.59 -0.91 -0.97 
    Trade services 2.83 3.29 3.46 3.63 3.79 3.83 
    Transport services 6.05 6.43 6.53 6.60 6.65 6.66 
    Business, financial & communications services 1.39 1.60 1.68 1.74 1.81 1.82 
    Other private and public services 3.34 3.56 3.65 3.74 3.83 3.85 
(2) Un-weighted output deviation index 5.98 8.21 9.21 10.28 11.47 11.71 
(3) weighted output deviation index 5.85 7.35 8.01 8.71 9.49 9.65 
     Employment Effects             
(8) Unskilled employment (economywide change) 9.14 10.26 10.69 11.11 11.56 11.64 
(8) Skilled employment (economywide change) 7.48 8.37 8.73 9.08 9.45 9.52 
(6) Unweighted employment deviation index -- unskilled 4.63 7.66 9.00 10.44 12.04 12.37 
(6) Unweighted employment deviation index -- skilled 4.45 7.54 8.91 10.39 12.03 12.36 
(7) Weighted employment deviation index -- unskilled 9.46 12.15 13.42 14.81 16.40 16.72 
(7) Weighted employment deviation index -- skilled 15.70 16.76 17.24 17.76 18.33 18.44 
